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In this comment we discuss the problem of reconciling the linear efficiency of price
returns with the long-memory of supply and demand. We present new evidence that
shows that efficiency is maintained by a liquidity imbalance that co-moves with the
imbalance of buyer vs. seller initiated transactions. For example, during a period
where there is an excess of buyer initiated transactions, there is also more liquidity
for buy orders than sell orders, so that buy orders generate smaller and less frequent
price responses than sell orders. At the moment a buy order is placed the transaction
sign imbalance tends to dominate, generating a price impact. However, the liquidity
imbalance rapidly increases with time, so that after a small number of time steps it
cancels all the inefficiency caused by the transaction sign imbalance, bounding the
price impact. While the view presented by Bouchaud et al. of a fixed and temporary
bare price impact is self-consistent and formally correct, we argue that viewing this
in terms of a variable but permanent price impact provides a simpler and more
natural view. This is in the spirit of the original conjecture of Lillo and Farmer, but
generalized to allow for finite time lags in the build up of the liquidity imbalance
after a transaction. We discuss the possible strategic motivations that give rise to
the liquidity imbalance and offer an alternative hypothesis. We also present some
results that call into question the statistical significance of large swings in expected
price impact at long times.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The fact that supply and demand fluctua-
tions have long-memory, which was indepen-
dently discovered by Bouchaud et al. (2004)
and Lillo and Farmer (2004), raises an appar-
ent paradox about compatibility with market
efficiency. The adage that buying drives the
2price up and selling drives it down is one of
the least controversial statements in finance.
The long-memory of supply and demand im-
plies that there are waves of buyer-initiated
or seller-initiated transactions that are highly
predictable using a simple linear algorithm.
All else being equal, this suggests that price
movements should also be highly predictable.
However, from an empirical point of view it
is clear that this is not the case – price move-
ments are essentially uncorrelated. How can
these two facts be reconciled?
The two original papers on this subject
offered two different views to resolve the ef-
ficiency paradox. In an interesting paper
Bouchaud et al. (2004) offered the view that
one can think in terms of a bare propagator
G0(t
′ − t|V, ǫ) that describes the impact of a
price change caused by a transaction of vol-
ume V and sign ǫ at time t as it is felt at
time t′. The total price impact can be com-
puted by summing up the bare propagators
associated with each transaction. They also
assume that the bare impact G0 is fixed, in
the sense that it only depends on the signed
volume of the transaction and the time de-
lay, and does not depend on other market
properties, such as liquidity. Given these as-
sumptions, it is clear that the bare propaga-
tor has to be temporary, in the sense that it
decays to zero as t′ − t → ∞. To see this
think about a buy order placed at time t,
and for simplicity let τ = t′ − t. because of
the long-memory, Pb(τ)/Ps(τ) ∼ τ−γ, where
0 < γ < 1 is the exponent for the asymptotic
decay of the autocorrelation function, Pb(τ)
is the probability of a buyer initiated transac-
tion at time t+τ , and Ps(τ) is the probability
of a seller initiated transaction at time t+ τ
(and both are averaged over t)1. Under their
assumptions, to cancel out the inefficiency
caused by the long-memory of transactions
1 It is possible to make more accurate predictions by
making use of a longer time history, as done in Lillo
and Farmer, but to be consistent with Bouchaud
et al. we will only consider lags of length one.
the sum of all the bare propagators has to go
to zero. Approximating the sum as an inte-
gral and taking into account the time decay
of the long memory implies that asymptoti-
cally G0(τ) decays as G0 ∼ τ (1−γ)/2.
An alternate point of view was given by
Lillo and Farmer (2004), who suggested that
this apparent paradox can be explained in
terms of permanent price impacts whose size
depends on liquidity, where liquidity is de-
fined as the price response to a transaction
of a given size. The liquidity for buying and
selling can be different, so that two orders
of the same size but opposite sign may gen-
erate different average price responses. This
point of view was motivated by related work
that suggests that liquidity fluctuations play
an essential role in price formation (Farmer
et al 2004, Weber and Rosenow 2004, Farmer
and Lillo 2004, Lillo and Farmer 2005b, Gille-
mot, Farmer, and Lillo 2005). This body of
work demonstrates that the price response
to transactions of the same size is highly
variable, and that in price formation liquid-
ity fluctuations dominate over fluctuations in
transaction size. Given that liquidity varies
with time by many orders of magnitude, it is
not surprising that there can be imbalances
between the liquidity of buying and selling of
less than a factor of two. As we will see, this
is all that is needed to maintain efficiency.
In Section 2.2 of “Random walks, liquid-
ity molasses, and critical response in finan-
cial markets”, Bouchaud, Kockelkoren and
Potters (2004), hereafter called BKP, criti-
cize one of the results of Lillo and Farmer
(2004). This may be confusing since this re-
sult only appeared in the version originally
posted on the archive and does not appear
at all in the final published paper. The error
in the original version was in the interpre-
tation of an empirical result that suggested
that it was possible to remove the excess
price impact by the immediate formation of
a liquidity imbalance (we will explain what
we mean by “immediate” more precisely in
a moment). Lillo and Farmer thank Marc
3Potters, who as referee was kind enough to
point out the error (and later became a non-
anonymous). The published version of Lillo
and Farmer removed this error and added a
section showing that immediate liquidity im-
balances are large, even if they are not large
enough to fully explain the efficiency paradox
all by themselves. The “liquidity molasses”
paper of BKP2 reflects a significant evolu-
tion in point of view from the earlier paper of
Bouchaud et al., which emphasized the role
of mean-reverting quote changes and did not
say much about liquidity imbalance. In con-
trast, Figures 7 and 12 of Lillo and Farmer
demonstrated that it is liquidity imbalance,
rather than mean-reverting price quotes, that
is the key to efficiency. This is echoed in
Figure 11 of BKP. We demonstrate this even
more graphically here.
In this comment we summarize some new
results that resolve this controversy by explic-
itly demonstrating how the liquidity imbal-
ance co-varies in time with the long-memory
of supply and demand, which we will refer to
as the “transaction imbalance” (defined more
precisely later). Because the liquidity imbal-
ance is initially weaker than the transaction
imbalance, there is a initially a nonzero price
impact to a transaction. However, the liq-
uidity imbalance associated with a transac-
tion grows, and after a short time τc becomes
large enough to quench any further growth in
the price response. For τ > τc the liquidity
imbalance roughly matches the transaction
imbalance, and the price impact remains con-
stant. Our explanation is thus based on the
view that price impacts are permanent but
require some time to build after a transac-
tion. While this is consistent with the formal-
ism introduced by Bouchaud et al (2004), we
think that our view is simpler and more nat-
ural. By introducing time dependence, this
2 The only caveat is that in Section 2.4 BKP assume
that liquidity imbalances are due to price manipu-
lation by market makers; in Section V we suggest
an alternative hypothesis that might cause this.
view contains elements of the original pro-
posals of both Bouchaud et al. and Lillo and
Farmer.
We now explain our new results in more
detail.
II. TIME DEPENDENCE OF THE
LIQUIDITY IMBALANCE
Suppose a transaction of a known sign ǫ
occurs at time t, where ǫ = +1 for a buyer
initiated transaction and ǫ = −1 for a seller
initiated transaction. Here and throughout
this comment t is measured in transaction
time, updated by one unit whenever a trans-
action occurs. The size of the expected price
impact at time t+ T can be written as3
E[r(T )ǫ] =
T∑
τ=0
∆r(τ)ǫ (1)
= ǫ
T∑
τ=0
[P+(τ)R+(τ) + P−(τ)R−(τ)].
∆r(τ)ǫ is the increment by which the size of
the expected price impact increases at time
t + τ . Throughout we will assume that all
price changes are measured as midprice log
returns, i.e. changes in the logarithm of the
average of the best quotes for buying and sell-
ing. By summing the log return increments
∆r(τ)ǫ we have defined them to be perma-
nent (though of course positive increments at
earlier times might be cancelled by negative
increments at later times). P+(τ) is the ex-
pected probability for the transaction at time
t + τ to have sign ǫ and R+ is the expected
log return for transactions at time t+ τ with
sign ǫ. P− and R− have similar definitions
but with sign −ǫ.
3 E[r(T )ǫ] is essentially the same as the average re-
sponse function R(l) of BKP. The only difference
is that we use log-returns rather than price differ-
ences.
4The condition that the price impact in-
creases at time t + τ is ∆r(τ)ǫ > 0, which
can alternatively be written
−R−(τ)
R+(τ)
<
P+(τ)
P−(τ)
. (2)
We will call the term on the right, which
reflects the predictability of the transaction
signs, the transaction imbalance. Similarly,
we will call the term on the left, which re-
flects the asymmetry of the expected price
response to buyer vs. seller initiated transac-
tions, the return imbalance.
To understand the factors that influence
the return imbalance it is useful to decom-
pose the expected return ∆r(τ) from directly
before the transaction at time t+τ to directly
before the transaction at time t+ τ + 1 as4
∆r(τ) = ∆rM (τ) + ∆rQ(τ). (3)
∆rM(τ) is the component of the return that
is immediately caused by the receipt of the
order that initiates the transaction, while
∆rQ(τ) is everything else, i.e. it includes
all changes due to cancellations, or to limit
orders that do not cause immediate transac-
tions. We can similarly decompose R+(τ) =
M+(τ)+Q+(τ) and R−(τ) =M−(τ)+Q−(τ).
We will call the ratio −M−(τ)/M+(τ) the liq-
uidity imbalance. This makes the term orig-
inally introduced by Lillo and Farmer more
precise. As we will demonstrate in the next
section, −R+(τ)/R−(τ) ≈ −M−(τ)/M+(τ)
for large values of τ , so that the return im-
balance is fairly well approximated by the liq-
uidity imbalance.
In Figure 1 we compare the transaction
imbalance, return imbalance, and liquidity
imbalance, using data from the on-book mar-
ket of the London Stock Exchange for the
stock Astrazeneca during the period 2000-
2002. Here and in the following analyses the
4 This was originally done in Equation (12) of Lillo
and Farmer, and is also equivalent to Equation (12)
of BKP.
FIG. 1: A comparison of the transac-
tion imbalance P+(τ)/P−(τ) (blue cir-
cles), return imbalance −R−/R+ (red
down triangles), and liquidity imbal-
ance −M−(τ)/M+(τ) (green up trian-
gles), for the stock Astrazeneca based
on on-book data from 2000−2002. Note
that we have excluded values at τ = 0,
where they diverge or are undefined; the
peaks occur at τ = −1.
time τ is measured in number of transactions,
rather than in real time. The transaction im-
balance reaches a peak just before and after
the transaction, and is roughly symmetric for
positive and negative values of τ . The trans-
action imbalance is not defined for τ = 0 and
the slow decay of transaction imbalance is
due to the long memory of order sign. For
negative values of τ the return imbalance
rises even more than the transaction imbal-
ance, drops immediately after the transac-
tion, and then builds up again. The liquidity
imbalance behaves similarly but overshoots
and becomes negative at small positive val-
ues of τ and then responds more slowly, so
that after τc ≈ 40 it is roughly equal to the
transaction imbalance (and the return imbal-
ance).
This result can be interpreted as follows.
Prior to the transaction there is a buildup
of the liquidity imbalance, which is amplified
by direct movement of quotes. Immediately
after the transaction the liquidity at the op-
posite best price is depleted by the transac-
5FIG. 2: A comparison of ∆r(τ) (black
down triangles), ∆rM (τ) (blue circles)
and ∆rQ(τ) (green crosses) for the stock
Astrazeneca based on on-book data
from 2000 − 2002. Returns are in units
of the average spread, which is 0.00154
in logarithmic price.
tion, so that the liquidity imbalance dips be-
low one. This means that the price impact is
actually amplified by the liquidity imbalance.
However, the depth of orders at the opposite
best price immediately builds, and the liquid-
ity imbalance quickly rises above one. Even
though orders of the same sign continue to
be more frequent, their impact is blunted by
the buildup of liquidity at the opposite best.
After about 40 transactions this buildup be-
comes sufficiently strong so that the imbal-
ance of signs is cancelled by the asymmetry
in the price response.
III. LIQUIDITY IMBALANCE VS.
QUOTE REVERSION
To make the time dynamics of the price
impact more clear, in Figure 2 we show
∆r(τ), ∆rM(τ) and ∆rQ(τ) as a function
of time. This shows that price efficiency
is mainly the result of the liquidity imbal-
ance and not mean-reverting quote changes.
∆r(τ) quickly approaches zero due mainly to
the quick decay of ∆rM(τ), which is a result
of the liquidity imbalance. ∆rQ(τ) begins
FIG. 3: A comparison of cumulative
price impacts when different effects are
included. RN (T ) (red up triangles) is
the naive cumulative price impact cal-
culated as a sum of fixed price im-
pacts with no liquidity variation and
no variable quote updating. RLC(T )
(green crosses) includes the effect of
non-transaction driven quote changes
but does not include fluctuating liq-
uidity. RFL(T ) (blue circles) includes
the effect of the liquidity imbalance,
without including any effect of non-
transaction driven quote changes. Fi-
nally, R(T ) (black down triangles) cor-
responds to the real cumulative price
impact. All results are for the stock
Vodafone Group based on the on-book
data from 2000 − 2002. Returns are
in units of the average spread, which
is approximately 0.00246 in logarithmic
price.
above zero, which pushes prices further from
efficiency, but eventually does turn negative
and helps to mean-revert the price. This ef-
fect is relatively small, however, and is not
consistent across stocks, as we show in a mo-
ment for Vodafone - where ∆rQ has an overall
effect of making prices less efficient.
In Figure 3 we present cumulative price
impacts for Vodafone rather than As-
trazeneca. We show four different curves.
The first of these (red up triangles) shows
6the naive cumulative price impact, defined as
RN(T ) =
∑T
τ=0 ∆rN(τ) = R0
∑T
τ=0[P+(τ) −
P−(τ)], where R0 is a constant, the aver-
age unconditional absolute midprice impact
measured from immediately before to imme-
diately after a transaction. This amounts
to assuming that there is no fluctuating liq-
uidity and no non-transaction driven quote
changes – as each transaction arrives it gives
the price a kick, whose size is independent
of time and equal to the average value. The
second curve (green crosses) adds the quote
changing effects of limit orders and cancel-
lations, RLC(T ) =
∑T
τ=0[∆rN (τ) + ∆rQ(τ)].
This would be observed if all transactions had
impact R0 and non-transaction driven quote
changes occurred as usual. Bouchaud et al
originally conjectured that non-transaction
driven quote changes play a major role in
mean reverting prices. We see that in this
case they actually have the opposite ef-
fect – they increase rather than decrease
the cumulative expected return. The third
curve (blue circles) shows the cumulative
price impact if only the effects of fluctu-
ating liquidity on transaction impacts are
included, RFL(T ) =
∑T
τ=0 ∆rM(τ). All
non-transaction driven quote changes are ex-
cluded. In this case the return is actu-
ally more efficient than the true cumulative
price impact (black down triangles), R(T ) =∑T
τ=0 ∆r(τ) =
∑T
τ=0[∆rM(τ)+∆rQ(τ)]. For
Astrazeneca we observe the opposite behav-
ior, i.e. for τ larger than 20 transactions RLC
is smaller than RN and RFL is larger than
the true cumulative impact R. However the
effect of non-transaction driven quotes is gen-
erally very small, as originally demonstrated
by Lillo and Farmer5.
In this section and throughout the com-
ment we have assumed that the imbalance
in market order impacts is due only to the
liquidity imbalance, but this is not entirely
true. An imbalance in transaction volumes
can also cause an imbalance in market or-
5 See figures 7 and 12.
der impacts. In other results that we do not
describe here, we find that the liquidity im-
balance is the dominant effect. We also find
that the imbalance in market order impacts
is largely driven by an imbalance in the fre-
quency with which transactions cause non-
zero returns, rather than asymmetric varia-
tions in the size of the returns. We intend to
report these results in more detail in a future
paper (Farmer et al., 2006).
IV. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF LONG TIME BEHAVIOR
One of the reasons that Bouchaud et al.
argued that the bare impact must be tempo-
rary was the observation of mean reversion of
price impact at very long times. In the range
1000 < T < 5000, they sometimes observe
that price impact becomes close to zero or
even becomes negative, while in other cases it
increases dramatically. They argue that this
reflects fluctuations in the balance between
liquidity taking and liquidity providing – in
some stocks and in some periods the liquid-
ity providers are stronger, and in others the
liquidity demanders are stronger.
A key issue that is not properly addressed
is statistical significance. Are these devia-
tions real, or are they just statistical fluctu-
ations, causing random variations from stock
to stock? In Figure 10 of Bouchaud et al.
there are error bars on the price impact,
which appear to indicate that the reversion
of the impact that is empirically observed is
statistically significant. However, these are
based on standard errors. This can be prob-
lematic when long-memory is a possibility, in
which case under the assumption of a nor-
mal distribution the one standard deviation
errors are of size
E ≈ σ
n(1−H)
, (4)
where n is the number of non-overlapping ob-
servations, H = 1 − γ/2 is the Hurst ex-
ponent, and σ is the standard deviation of
7the random process (Beran, 1994). When
H = 1/2 this reduces to the expression for
standard error, but when H > 1/2 there is
long-memory and errors can be much larger
than one might naively expect. Volatility
is a long-memory process with Hurst expo-
nents in the neighborhood ofH ≈ 0.75 (Gille-
mot, Farmer, and Lillo, 2005). Thus, errors
decrease roughly as the fourth root rather
than the square root of the number of non-
overlapping observations.
This problem is compounded by the fact
that the increments of the response function
are overlapping. Thus, in a data series with
a million points, at lags of T = 1000 there
are only 1000 non-overlapping intervals. To
avoid crossing daily boundaries Bouchaud et
al and BKP only used events within the same
day, which decreases the number of inde-
pendent intervals for large values of T even
more. Because of the overlapping intervals
and long-memory effects, errors at nearby
times are highly correlated – once the price
impact function becomes large (or small), it
is likely to remain so for some time simply
because of the correlated errors.
Properly resolving the question of whether
or not the large excursions of the price im-
pact at long times are statistically significant
is a difficult job that is beyond the scope
of this comment. But just to illustrate the
problem, in Figure 4 we make a crude esti-
mate of error bars for the price impact. We
do this by measuring the standard deviation
σ(T ) of impacts at several different time in-
tervals T and estimating the one standard
deviation statistical error using Equation 4.
The number of non-overlapping intervals is
n = N/T , where N is the total number of
points in the data set. Because the standard
deviation of the impact grows roughly as
√
T ,
the error bars therefore grow roughly as T 3/2.
As a result, at T ≈ 100 the error bars be-
come bigger than the estimated values. The
figure also shows the error bars computed as-
suming standard errors, i.e. H = 1/2. In
this case the error bars are smaller than the
FIG. 4: A crude estimate of the sta-
tistical errors in the price impact at dif-
ferent times for Astrazeneca based on
the on-book data for 2000-2002 based
on equation 4 (triangle up). The cir-
cles are the estimated mean impact. For
comparison the figure shows also stan-
dard errors (triangle down). Returns
are shown in units of the average spread.
mean values. This procedure is crude – it as-
sumes normality, which is a poor assumption
for price impacts, and the use of overlapping
intervals should give a somewhat more accu-
rate estimate than this procedure would indi-
cate. But at least it takes long-memory into
account, and it indicates that a more care-
ful study is needed to determine whether the
divergences in the price impact observed at
long times by Bouchaud et al and BKP are
statistical fluctuations.
V. STRATEGIC INTERPRETATION
While the discussion in Sections 2 and
3 gives insight into how efficiency is main-
tained, it does not address the strategic mo-
tivations for why it is maintained. Is the mo-
tive profit seeking, liquidity demanding, risk
reduction, or is there some other cause? If it
is profit seeking, then what kind of strategy
causes the inefficiency to be removed? For ex-
ample, suppose there is a buying wave. We
have demonstrated that the main force stop-
8ping a run up in prices is the rapid formation
of a liquidity imbalance. Is this imbalance
created intentionally by market makers, or is
it a side effect of some other behavior?
Bouchaud et al and BKP speculate that
this is due to intentional controlling of prices
by market makers. We fully agree that long-
memory is bad news for market makers, but
whether they can solve it by controlling the
price is not so obvious. The main reasons
for our skepticism are inventory control and
the need for cooperative behavior if mar-
ket making is competitive. When a buying
wave occurs, to keep the price from rising by
maintaining a liquidity imbalance the market
makers must sell and thereby absorb most
of the buying wave themselves. This causes
them to accumulate a negative inventory. To
flatten this inventory they eventually have to
buy, which will tend to drive the price up.
Alternatively, they might wait for the next
selling wave, but this could be a long time
coming – once in a buying wave, because of
the long-memory, the most likely future is
more buying waves. Also, it might not match
the previous buying wave in size, still leaving
them with a net negative inventory. In a com-
petitive market making situation (which ex-
ists for both the London and Paris Stock Ex-
changes), inventory constraints gives strong
incentives for market makers to try to free
ride on each other. Once they have fulfilled
their inventory goals, free riders will back
their quotes off to let someone else absorb the
rest of the dangerous negative inventory. It
seems that the Nash equilibrium would be for
everyone to defect. Taken together, these is-
sues could make it difficult for market makers
to control the price, particularly in a compet-
itive situation.
An alternate hypothesis is that liquid-
ity providing and liquidity taking are self-
reinforcing. Liquidity is not only provided
by market makers – it is also provided by di-
rectional traders who are simply more patient
than their liquidity taking cousins. By direc-
tional trader we mean someone who at any
given time either wants to buy or wants to
sell but never wants to do both. Because they
are more patient they use limit orders, but to
avoid broadcasting their true intentions they
only place orders of a size that they think
the market can absorb, and place new orders
only after their existing orders are hit. When
the patient sellers observe an impatient buy-
ing wave of liquidity takers, they increase the
size of their sell orders and replace them more
frequently. The impatient buyers see the re-
sulting increase in liquidity, which stimulates
them to submit more market orders. This
gives rise to bi-directional causality – buy liq-
uidity taking causes sell liquidity providing,
and sell liquidity providing causes buy liq-
uidity taking (and similarly with buying and
selling reversed). This scenario is indirectly
suggested by the lack of a clear lead-lag re-
lationship between liquidity taking and liq-
uidity providing in Figure 1. The key differ-
ence is that under this scenario the inventory
swings are absorbed by traders who want to
absorb them, rather than by market makers
who may not want to absorb them if they are
too large. Market makers will participate in
liquidity provision to the extent that it con-
forms to their inventory constraints, but hide
behind directional liquidity providers when it
does not.
Such bursts of buying and selling may be
triggered by the occurrence of large hidden
orders, according to the theory developed
by Lillo, Mike and Farmer (2005). When
traders receive large hidden orders, some may
choose to execute them via a sequence of
smaller limit orders and some via a sequence
of smaller market orders. In either case, un-
der this scenario such a hidden order will trig-
ger a response of other hidden orders of the
opposite sign and opposite liquidity type, am-
plifying the exogenous input of large hidden
orders.
9VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have demonstrated that efficiency in
the face of long-memory in transaction signs
is maintained by the creation of a liquid-
ity imbalance that asymmetrically alters the
expected return triggered by a transaction.
This liquidity imbalance takes a fairly short
time to build up – for the cases we have ob-
served here most of the build up happens
in about 5 transactions (on average a few
minutes for Astrazeneca), and the build up
is completed by about 40 transactions (on
average about 25 minutes for Astrazeneca).
As a result the price impact rises to roughly
0.25 − 0.3 of the average spread and then
levels out. Under this view, price impact is
variable and permanent. When a transaction
happens, it affects the next 40 or so transac-
tions by building up their liquidity, until the
liquidity imbalance matches the transaction
imbalance, and after that the two move in
tandem. This generalizes the proposal origi-
nally made by Lillo and Farmer by allowing
some time (but not much) for the growth of
the liquidity imbalance.
The fixed bare propagator approach of
Bouchaud et al does not formally contradict
this view – in fact in BKP they more or less
embrace it. However, to us this interpreta-
tion does not seem to arise naturally from
their formalism. By proposing a bare prop-
agator that is fixed, their phenomenological
theory requires that it be temporary in order
to eventually blunt the growth of the price
impact. This is formally correct – once the
liquidity imbalance is set up, for τ > τc the
time decay of the bare propagator is needed
to match the time decay of the transaction
imbalance. We think that the results we have
presented here shows that it is simpler and
more natural to think in terms of a perma-
nent but variable impact function. This is
perhaps just a matter of taste – one can think
about this phenomenon in either way. In any
case, in this comment we have presented some
new results that make the explicit mecha-
nisms that enforce market efficiency clearer.
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